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EVIDENCE
GREGORY HUFFAKER*

I. INTRODUCTION
Hearsay issues predominated the evidence questions in cases which
were decided during the survey year. In one case, the court of appeals
held the Rules of Evidence do not apply to suppression hearings. The
confrontation clause may, nevertheless, bar the use of hearsay evidence
offered against the defendant at a suppression hearing. In other hearsay
cases, the court considered the admissibility of out of court statements
of co-conspirators and of co-defendants and the court decided that implied
assertions are not hearsay. The only significant evidentiary decision which
did not involve hearsay concerned the admissibility of juror testimony
under Rule 11-606(B).
II. HEARSAY ISSUES
A. Sixth Amendment Bars Use of Hearsay in Suppression Hearings
In State v. Hensel,' the court of appeals considered a warrantless search
of ranch property where police found illegal drugs in the possession of
Craig Hensel. 2 The police relied on an authorization to search the premises
from Hensel's mother, who had complained to police that Craig had stolen
her car, that she wanted it back, and that he probably had illegal drugs
in his possession.3 Mrs. Hensel did not appear at the suppression hearing;
the only evidence of Mrs. Hensel's authority to consent to the search was
in the testimony of a police officer. 4 Defense counsel objected to the
testimony on the grounds of hearsay and that defendant was being deprived of his right of confrontation. 5 The trial court overruled the objections and denied the motion to suppress. 6
The court of appeals held that the New Mexico Rules of Evidence do
*J.D., Harvard Law School; Mr. Huffaker is a partner in the firm of Poole, Tinnin and Martin,
P.C., Albuquerque, NM.
1. 106 N.M. 8, 738 P.2d 126 (Ct. App. 1987).
2. Id. at 8, 738 P.2d at 126.
3. Id. at 9, 738 P.2d at 127.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 10, 738 P.2d at 128.
6. Id.
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not apply to suppression hearings on the authority of Rule 11-1101 (D)(1). 7
The New Mexico appellate courts had not previously construed Rule 111101, although the interpretation of the Rule in this case is consistent
with the United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Matlock.8
In the next breath, however, the court suppressed the evidence and
reversed the district court because Hensel was denied his right of confrontation by not having an opportunity to cross-examine his mother.9
The court ruled the use of hearsay evidence under the circumstances was
"fundamentally unfair.""° The court's decision is somewhat curious because, while it acknowledges the source of the confrontation right is the
sixth amendment," the cases it cites in support of its holding are, with
two exceptions, either not sixth amendment cases, or reach an opposite
result under the sixth amendment.' 2 Moreover, in Matlock, the United
States Supreme Court stated in dictum that the admission of hearsay at
the suppression hearing did not violate a defendant's right of confrontation
under the sixth amendment. 3
The New Mexico Supreme Court denied certiorari in Hensel, so the
law in New Mexico now provides that when the key witness in a suppression hearing does not take the stand, the declarations of that witness are
inadmissible hearsay under the sixth amendment. 4 Unanswered questions
7. "Rules inapplicable. The rules (other than those with respect to privileges) do not apply in
the following situations: (1) Preliminary questions offact. The determination of questions of fact
preliminary to the admissibility of evidence when the issue is to be determined by the judge under
Rule 11-104 ...." See, SCRA 1986 11-104(A).
8. 415 U.S. 164, 172-77 (1974) (construing FED. R. EviD. 104(a) and I 101(d)(l)). There is no
significant difference between SCRA 1986 11-104(A), II-I 01(D)(1) and FED. R. EVID. 104(a),
I 101(d)(1).
9. 106 N.M. at 10, 738 P.2d at 128.
10. Id.
1I. No mention is made of the New Mexico Constitution.
12. 106 N.M. at 10, 738 P.2d at 128. State v. Asbury, 145 Ariz. 381, 701 P.2d 1189 (Ct. App.
1984), and Mascarenas v. State, 80 N.M. 537, 458 P.2d 789 (1969), support the holding based on
the sixth amendment. Asbury, 145 Ariz. at 387, 701 P.2d at 1194 (relying on State v. Hanely, 108
Ariz. 144, 148, 493 P.2d 1201, 1205 (1972)). In McLean v. State, 482 A.2d 101 (Del. 1984), the
court allowed admission of a hospital record of a blood-alcohol analysis in a trial for vehicular
homicide without an opportunity for the defendant to cross-examine the hospital technician who
performed the test. Id. at 103-04. The court used the indicia of reliability which appear in SCRA
1986 11-803(F), to override the sixth amendment. Id. at 104-05. State v. Wilson, 183 N.J. Super.
86, 443 A.2d 252 (1981), was a due process case which discussed 14th amendment due process
and liberty interest issues in connection with a termination hearing regarding a pretrial criminal
intervention program. In State v. Self, 88 N.M. 37, 536 P.2d 1093 (Ct. App. 1975), the court
disposed of a claim that hearsay evidence that the declarant had obtained a gun from the defendant,
who had obtained the gun in a pawnshop robbery, was not admissible as an admission against interest
under current SCRA 1986 11-804(B)(4). 88 N.M. at 40-42, 536 P.2d at 1096-98. The court did not
reach the constitutional claim. Id. at 40, 536 P.2d at 1096.
13. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 174-75 (1974).
14. cert. denied, 106 N.M. 8, 738 P.2d 126 (1987). The court distinguished statements of lesser
than "key" declarants, noting the denial of the right of confrontation may be harmless in certain
circumstances. 106 N.M. at 1I,738 P.2d at 129.
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suggested by this decision are whether it extends to statements by codefendants, co-conspirators, or by confidential informants, and what important rules of evidence, not involving a question of confrontation, will
no longer be applicable in suppression hearings under the court's interpretation of Rule 11-1 101(D)(4).
B. Co-conspiratorException to the Hearsay Rule
State v. Zinn 5 decided several evidentiary issues arising in the course
of a trial where defendant was convicted of nineteen felonies, including
murder, kidnapping, criminal sexual penetration and conspiracy to commit various crimes. One issue decided in Zinn concerned the admission
at trial of hearsay statements by two co-conspirators who claimed that a
third co-conspirator told both of them that the defendant had ordered the
third conspirator to "get rid of" the victim. 6 The evidence was offered
to show the defendant's involvement in the murder, which occurred
outside his presence.
Rule 11-801(D)(2)(e) governs: 7 "A statement is not hearsay if: . . .
[t]he statement is offered against a party and is . . . (e) a statement by a
co-conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the
conspiracy." Applying "well-settled" prior decisions construing the hearsay exception 8 the court easily found independent record evidence of a
conspiracy sufficient to meet the requirement that a conspiracy be independently proved to the level of a prima facie case.' 9 This much broke
no new ground.
The court went on, however, and noted with approval the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Bourjaily v. United States.2' In Bourjaily,
the Supreme Court held that the hearsay statement of a co-conspirator
could itself be considered along with independent evidence of a conspiracy
15. 106 N.M. 544, 746 P.2d 650 (1987).
16. Id. at 551-52, 746 P.2d at 657-58.
17. The court noted that the defendant did not object to the first co-conspirator's testimony, but
did object to the second co-conspirator's testimony six days further into the trial. The court seemed
on the verge of finding harmless error or waiver: "It would have been of little effect for the trial
court to have sustained Zinn's objection to [the second co-conspirator's] testimony . . . because the
statement had already been planted-properly-in the jurors' minds." Id. at 551, 746 P.2d at 657.
Instead, the court proceeded to the hearsay issue.
18. Id. State v. Johnson, 98 N.M. 92, 645 P.2d 448 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 78 N.M. 336, 648
P.2d 794 (1982); State v. Mead, 100 N.M. 27, 665 P.2d 289 (Ct. App. 1983), modified sub nom.,
State v. Segotta, 100 N.M. 498, 672 P.2d 1129 (1983); State v. Harge, 94 N.M. II, 17, 606 P.2d
1105, 1111 (Ct. App. 1979), rev'd sub nom., Buzbee v. Donnelly, 96 N.M. 692, 634 P.2d 1244
(1981).
19. Zinn, 106 N.M. at 551, 746 P.2d at 657. In fact the court stated the independent evidence
allowed an inference of conspiracy "beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
20. It is not clear whether it did so as part of its holding. The court's discussion of Bourjaily
may have been prompted by Justice Walter's dissent on the grounds the independent evidence did
not show a conspiracy to murder, but only to kidnap and rape. Id. at 552-53, 746 P.2d at 658-59
(discussing Bourjaily, 107 S.Ct. 2775 (1987)).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 19

in determining admissibility of the hearsay statement under Federal Rule
of Evidence 801(D)(2)(e). The Supreme Court also decided that the standard of proof for the trial court's determination of admissibility under
Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) 21 is a preponderance of the evidence,
regardless of the standard of proof on the substantive issues.22 Thus, New
Mexico trial courts may now consider co-conspirators' hearsay statements
along with independent evidence of a conspiracy when they make the
determination required by Rule 11-801(D)(2)(e) that the declarant was a
member of the conspiracy, and that the statement furthered the aims of
the conspiracy. 23 In making the determination of admissibility under Rule
11-104(a) the trial court should apply the preponderance of the evidence
standard regardless of the existence of a higher standard for the merits,
for instance beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case, or clear and
convincing evidence in some civil matters.
Finally, relying on United States v. Inadi,24 the court held, over a
vigorous dissent by Justice Walters, 25 that the confrontation clause is no
bar to admissibility of a co-conspirator's hearsay statement. Inadi holds
that the confrontation clause's "unavailability rule . . . is not applicable
to co-conspirators' out-of-court statements."'26 Thus, prosecutors and others
seeking to introduce co-conspirator hearsay in New Mexico need not
demonstrate that the co-conspirator is unavailable to testify before offering
the hearsay declaration.
C. Standardsfor Admissions of Co-defendant's Out of Court
Confession
In a somewhat similar case, State v. Earnest,27 the supreme court ruled
admissible the out-of-court confession of a criminal accused's co-defendant. The case was before the court on remand from the United States
Supreme Court28 for proceedings not inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
opinion in Lee v. Illinois.29 Lee held that the confession of an accused's
21. SCRA 1986 11-104(A) is virtually identical to FED. R. EViD. 104(a).
Questions of admissibility generally. Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility
of evidence shall be determined by the judge, subject to the provisions of Paragraph
B. In making his determination he is not bound by the Rules of Evidence except
those with respect to privileges.
SCRA 1986 11-104(A).
22. Bourjaily, 107 S.Ct. at 2778-82.
23. See id. at 2783 (Stevens, J., concurring).
24. 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
25. 106 N.M. at 554-55, 746 P.2d at 660-61. Justice Stowers did not participate in the decision,
so the rulings on these issues are sustained by a three to one majority of the court.
26. 475 U.S. at 394.
27. 106 N.M. 411, 744 P.2d 539 (1987).
28. New Mexico v. Earnest, 477 U.S. 648 (1986) (per curiam).
29. 476 U.S. 530 (1986).
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co-defendant is presumptively unreliable and that its use against an accused would violate the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment. 3 °
The Lee Court went on to rule that the presumption may be rebutted,
however, where there is no material departure from the standard of admissibility under the general confrontation rule, the purpose of which is
to "augment accuracy in the fact-finding process by ensuring the defendant effective means to test adverse evidence." 3 The Court also described the standard as whether the "statement at issue bears sufficient
indicia of reliability to satisfy Confrontation Clause concerns." 32 A third
statement of the standard in Lee is that "even if certain hearsay evidence
does not fall within 'a firmly rooted hearsay exception' and is thus presumptively unreliable and inadmissible for Confrontation Clause purposes,
it may nonetheless meet Confrontation Clause reliability standards if it
is supported by a 'showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.' '33
In Earnest the New Mexico Supreme Court applied its reading of Lee
to the facts surrounding the taking of the co-defendant's statement and
to the evidence at trial and found four reasons why the statement bore
"sufficient 'indicia of reliability"' to satisfy the confrontation clause. '
The court did not mention the other formulations of the analysis discussed
in Lee. a5
First, the court stated that the co-defendant was not offered leniency
for giving his confession to police officers, and that he was in fact convicted of murder in a separate trial and sentenced to life imprisonment.36
This supported a conclusion that his statement was reliable. The reported
decisions in the Lee case do not state whether Lee's co-defendant was
offered leniency for giving his statement, although the description of the
circumstances of the confession suggests he was not. 37 According to the
opinion, the co-defendant gave his statement after the police had let him
30. Id. at 539. The confrontation clause provides "[in] all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him .
31. Id. at 543 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980)).
32. Id. at 542.
33. Id. at 543. The quoted phrases are from Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). The New
Mexico Supreme Court relied on this formulation of the confrontation clause analysis when it reversed
defendant's conviction before the appeal to the United States Supreme Court. State v. Earnest, 103
N.M. 95, 98-99, 703 P.2d 872, 875-76 (1985).
34. There was no question of unavailability of the witness in the case because the co-defendants
had been called to the stand at defendant's trial and had refused to testify, citing the fifth amendment,
even after being granted use immunity and found in contempt. State v. Earnest, 103 N.M. at 98,
703 P.2d at 875; SCRA 1986 11-804(A)(2).
35. 106 N.M. at 411-12, 744 P.2d at 539-40. As the court noted, this was the formulation of the
anlysis Justice Rehnquist used in his concurring opinion in New Mexico v. Earnest, 477 U.S. at
540.
36. 106 N.M. at 412, 744 P.2d at 540.
37. Id.
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meet with Lee and she told him the police knew about the "whole thing"
and reminded him he had said "we wouldn't let one or the other take
the rap alone." 38 The reported decisions do not reveal the result of Lee's
co-defendant's trial.
The second reason supporting the New Mexico Supreme Court's conclusion of reliability was that the co-defendant's statement was "strongly"
against his penal interest.39 He admitted he "tried" to cut the victim's
throat and it was clear from a colloquy with police in the taped statement
that wounds to the throat were thought to be the cause of death.' The
court also noted that the co-defendant's confession exposed him to the
death penalty because it included a description of applicable aggravating
circumstances. 4 The court did not state, however, whether the co-defendant knew about the existence or significance of aggravating circumstances or the possibility of the death penalty. Nor did the court discuss
footnote 5 in Lee v. Illinois.42 There Justice Brennan stated "we reject
respondent's categorization of the hearsay involved in this case as a simple
'declaration against penal interest.' That concept defines too large a class
for meaningful Confrontation Clause analysis. We decide this case as
involving a confession by an accomplice which incriminates a criminal
defendant." 4 3 The footnote is ambiguous, to be sure. One possible construction is that the United States Supreme Court has rejected the "against
penal interest" concept as a grounds for showing "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." Another equally plausible construction of the
footnote is that "simply" noting that any confession is against a penal
interest is not enough, but a stronger or more particularized showing
would be acceptable. The New Mexico Supreme Court's emphasis on
the strength of the conflict between Earnest's co-defendant's statement
and his penal interest may be directed towards fitting this latter construction.
Third, the court noted Earnest's co-defendant made no attempt to shift
responsibility from himself to Earnest or another co-defendant." The court
stated that the co-defendant equally implicated all three defendants. 45
Although Lee's co-defendant did not try to shift responsibility from himself to Lee, the United States Supreme Court emphasized his statement
implicated Lee in areas no other evidence did: premeditation and planning
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

476
106
Id.
Id.
476
Id.
106
Id.

U.S. at 533.
N.M. at 412, 744 P.2d at 540.
U.S. at 544.
N.M. at 412, 744 P.2d at 540.
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of the two murders, and facilitation in one of them which Lee had denied.46
Furthermore the Court noted that one reality of the criminal process is
"that once partners in a crime recognize 'the jig is up,' they tend to lose
any identity of interest and immediately become antagonists, rather than
accomplices. "47 Thus, while Earnest may have presented a better case
for admitting the confession than did Lee, Earnest does not deal with
"the jig is up" theory which caused the United States Supreme Court to
add an extra note of caution which seems to apply generally to codefendants' post-arrest statements.
The fourth factor which led the Earnest court to conclude that the codefendant's statement was reliable was independent evidence at trial which
the court found substantially corroborated the description of the murder
in the co-defendant's statement. 48 The court found substantial corroboration in four particular congruences between the other evidence and the
co-defendant's statement.49 Only one of the congruences, however, concerned the elements of the murder.5" The court's finding that the codefendant's statement was reliable is seriously flawed in light of Lee v.
Illinois. Before the Supreme Court, the State of Illinois argued that the
co-defendant's confession was reliable because it "interlocked" with the
defendant's confession "on some points." 5 ' The Court rejected that argument because the two statements did not interlock on the key points
of the defendant's premeditation, planning and facilitation of the murders;
the Court termed the congruence "selective reliability." 52 The court stated,
As we have consistently recognized, a codefendant's confession is
presumptively unreliable as to the passages detailing the defendant's
conduct or culpability because those passages may well be the product
of the codefendant's desire to shift or spread blame, curry favor,
avenge himself, or divert attention to another. If those portions of
the codefendant's purportedly 'interlocking' statement which bear to
any significant degree on the defendant's participation in the crime
are not thoroughly substantiated by the defendant's own confession,
46. 476 U.S. at 545.
47. Id. at 544-45.
48. 106 N.M. at 412, 744 P.2d at 540.
49. They were, first, a description of a drug deal, apparently some time before the murder; second,
a belief showed by the defendants that the victim was an informant; third, an attempt to kill the
victim by another means than the actual cause; and, fourth, the co-defendant's accurate description
of where the murder weapon could be found. Id.
50. Although the court referred in its opinion only to a crime of murder, Earnest was also convicted
of conspiracy to murder, kidnapping, conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance and possession
of a controlled substance. State v. Earnest, 103 N.M. at 96, 703 P.2d at 873. The co-defendant was
convicted of all the same crimes in a separate trial. State v. Boeglin, 105 N.M. 247, 248, 731 P.2d
943, 944 (1987).
51. 476 U.S. at 545.
52. Id.
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the admission of the statement poses too serious a threat to the
accuracy of the verdict to be countenanced by the Sixth Amendment.53
To be sure, the New Mexico Supreme Court apparently had no conflicting evidence before it, so it was not faced with discrepancies in the
evidence. Nevertheless, the interlocking on only collateral issues between
the co-defendant's and the defendant's statements in Lee is hardly distinguishable from the interlocking on these collateral issues and one element of the crime between the co-defendant's statement and other types
of evidence in Earnest.
The language of the United States Supreme Court opinion on the "selective reliability" issue is strong, but it is still qualified by the opinion's
clear recognition that the presumption of unreliability may be rebutted.54
Although the New Mexico Supreme Court did not clearly follow the Lee
Court's reasoning on the selective reliability issue, it offered three other
grounds
for finding that the presumption of unreliability had been rebut55
ted.
Earnestthus serves as a good source of four possible avenues to argue
admissibility of a co-defendant's confession for practitioners faced with
hearsay and confrontation clause problems. Practitioners considering the
question of admissibility when the co-defendant is unavailable due to a
refusal to testify should also be aware that the type of analysis Earnest
requires can be disposed of entirely if the statement is admissible under
another "firmly rooted" exception to the hearsay rule. 56
D. "Implied Assertions" are not Hearsay
An interesting hearsay issue was decided in Jim v. Budd.57 In this

wrongful death action the plaintiff's decedent Was shop foreman at a shop
where the defendant, an independent trucker, brought his belly-dump
tractor trailer truck for repairs on the belly-dump mechanism. 8 The bellydump mechanism consisted of two heavy metal gates at the bottom of
the trailer which, when open, allowed the contents of the trailer to flow
out and onto the ground.59 To prepare the mechanism for work, both men
hooked chain between the gates and a bracket on the side of the tractor
53. id.
54. Id. at 543, 546.
55. The United States Supreme Court declined an invitation to examine these issues in light of
Lee when it denied Earnest's second petition for certiorari in late 1987. 108 S.Ct. 284 (1987).
56. 476 U.S. at 543.
57. 107 N.M. 489, 760 P.2d 782 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 106 N.M. 95, 739 P.2d 509 (1987).
58. Id. at 490, 760 P.2d at 783.
59. Id.
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to keep the gates in an open position.' According to the testimony at
issue, the decedent told the defendant to "[1]et the gates down against
the chain" to take any slack out of the chain. 6 Defendant positioned the
switch which operated the gate mechanism in the "closed" position,
which had the effect of applying pressure to the gates in the direction of
closure, and therefore also applied pressure against the chain which kept
the gates open.62 Instead of then putting the switch in the "off" position,
the defendant left it in the "closed" position. 63 This kept pressure against
the chain and the gates in an effort to close them.' In the second part of
the testimony at issue, the decedent answered "yes" when the defendant
asked him if that was satisfactory.65 Because of a hairline crack in the
bracket holding one end of the chain, the chain gave way and the gate
closed on the decedent, Mr. Jim, killing him.'
Plaintiff objected to the admission of both statements of the decedent
on hearsay grounds. 67 The trial court admitted them over the objection,
and the jury brought in a verdict for the defendant.68 The court of appeals.
agreed with the trial court, holding that the statements were not hearsay
under Rule 11-801.69
The court characterized the statements as "implied assertions" offered
to show that the decedent was in control of the procedure and that he
knew what he was doing. 7" The words, the court said, were not offered
for their truth, because "they have no particular relevance" and because
the statement "let the gates down against the chain" were words of
.direction and not an assertion. 7 The court focused on two parts of Rule
11-801 to reach its holding. Rule 11-801(C) defines hearsay as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial
or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."
Rule 11-801(A) defines "statement" as "(1) an oral or written assertion
or (2) non-verbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an
assertion." The court construed these provisions to mean that statements
or conduct which are not assertive are not hearsay.72 The court found
support for its holding in the commentators and case law which have
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id. at 491, 760 P.2d at 784.
Id. at 490, 491, 760 P.2d at 783, 784.
SCRA 1986 11-801; Budd, 107 N.M. at 491, 760 P.2d at 784.
107 N.M. at 491, 760 P.2d at 784.
Id.
Id.
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concluded, in essence, that implied assertions are more trustworthy than
explicit statements of the same assertions by the same person. 73
Two lines of reasoning support this proposition. First, in the case of
an implied assertion, issues of sincerity and credibility are not involved
because the declarant did not intend to make the assertion which is implied. Put another way, purposeful deception in making an assertion is
less likely in the absence of an intent to make an assertion.74 In this case,
the reasoning goes: the decedent did not intend to say "I am in control
of this instrumentality" when he said "Yes, [the gates have been let down
to my satisfaction.]" Second, because the declarant has undertaken another action,. in this case the words uttered, which is consistent with the
implied assertion, there is a justifiable presumption that the implied assertion is correct.75 Thus, when the decedent said "let the gates down
against the chain," he made a declaration entirely consistent with the
implied assertion sought to be proved, that he had control of the instrumentality. This is so because giving directions implies control.
The court's work did not end when it determined that the declarations
were not hearsay. Plaintiff raised three other objections. First, she argued
that the testimony was untrustworthy because the declarant was unavailable and the defendant witness was an interested party.76 The court quickly
disposed of this argument by pointing out that whether the statements
were made was a question of weight and credibility of the witness rather
than a question of the truth of the utterances.77 The court relied on cases
involving direct testimony by interested defendants in wrongful death
cases where the only person who could have contradicted the testimony
was the decedent.78 These cases discuss the principle that testimony of
an interested witness always raises an issue of credibility for a jury.79
Next, plaintiff argued that the evidence was so prejudicial to plaintiff
73. Id.
74. E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 250 (3d ed. 1984). The Advisory Committee Notes
to Rule 801 adopt this rationale: Assertion by non-verbal conduct
[aidmittedly ...

is untested with respect to the perception ...

but the Advisory

Committee is of the view that the dangers are minimal in the absence of an intent
to assert and do not justify the loss of the evidence on hearsay grounds ....
Similar considerations govern nonassertive verbal conduct and verbal conduct
which is assertive but offered as a basis for inferring something other than the
matter asserted . ...

FED. R. EVID. 801, advisory committee notes to subdivision (a).
75. 4 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, paragraph 801(a)[01] (1983).
76. 107 N.M. at 492, 760 P.2d at 785.
77. Id.
78. Silva v. City of Albuquerque, 94 N.M. 332, 610 P.2d 219 (Ct. App. 1980); Strickland v.
Roosevelt County, 94 N.M. 459, 612 P.2d 689 (Ct. App. 1980).
79. But see Silva v. City of Albuquerque, 94 N.M. 332, 334, 610 P.2d 219, 221 (when other
uncontradicted evidence requires the same result whether or not the defendant's testimony is believed,
no jury issue arises).
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its probative value was outweighed, relying on Rule 11-403.8o The court
.endorsed the trial court's exercise of discretion, in accordance with the
rule, to admit the evidence.8" The court noted that prejudice alone did
not justify exclusion, and that in balancing the weights, the probative
value was heightened because decedent's control of the instrumentality
could only be shown by the testimony including the statements; the statements were part of the only way control could be proved.8"
Finally, plaintiff argued that she was entitled to a limiting instruction
both when the evidence was admitted and as part of the charge to the
jury. 3 The court held that, given the trial court's proper finding that the
statements were not hearsay, a limiting instruction was unnecessary, and
that the uniform civil jury instruction on credibility of witnesses, which
was given, disposed of the credibility, bias and interest of the witness
issues. "
The decision does not describe the proffered instruction.85 If the plaintiff
argued that a limiting instruction should have been given to caution the
jury that the "yes" statement was not offered for its truth, i.e. that
decedent understood and was satisfied with the position of the switch,
perhaps some question might be raised about the propriety of this part
of the decision. It is within the realm of possibility that an uninstructed
jury might conclude that decedent not only controlled the procedure but
also knew that defendant had left the switch in a position which continued
to apply pressure to the gates, risking the result which occurred. A limiting
instruction might have been appropriate and might have aided plaintiff's
jury argument that defendant was negligent, in leaving the switch closed
and the pressure on, and that there was no proof decedent had knowledge
of the negligence.

III. OTHER ISSUES

Another evidentiary issue in State v. Zinn86 concerned the admissibility
of juror testimony. While the jury was deliberating, the jurors sent five
written questions to the trial court.87 The court answered them at a time
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

SCRA 1986 11-403; 107 N.M. at 492, 760 P.2d at 785.
107 N.M. at 492, 760 P.2d at 785.
Id.
Id.
N.M. U.J.I. CIVIL 13-2003.
See 107 N.M. at 492, 760 P.2d at 785.
106 N.M. 544, 746 P.2d 650 (1987).
Id. at 549, 746 P.2d at 655.
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when the defendant was not present in court. 8" Defendant's attorney
waived defendant's presence. 89
On appeal, defendant argued that his absence from court when the
judge formulated his answers to the jury's questions created a presumption9
v. State.
of prejudice under the supreme court's recent ruling in Hovey
Hovey held that the State had the burden of showing, in post-trial record
proceedings at the trial court, that the court's communication to the jury
did not affect the jury's verdict and therefore did not deny the defendant
his right to be present. 9 Hovey did not reach the due process and confrontation provisions of either the United States or the New Mexico
constitution.92 Nor did Hovey reach any issue about how the State might
meet its evidentiary burden in post-trial proceedings because the issue
there was raised and decided on appeal.93
At post-trial proceedings in Zinn, the State offered two identical affidavits from each juror and the oral testimony of the foreperson to show
that the judge's commmunication did not affect the jury's verdict.9 4 The
evidentiary question arose when the defendant objected to the jury evidence on the grounds of Rule 11-606(B). 9 5 The supreme court held that
the State's use of the evidence to show "no affect on the verdict" did
not contravene the purpose of Rule 11-606(B), which "is to prevent
tampering and harassment of the jury and inquiry into its deliberations
to the end of casting doubt on the jury's competence." '9 6 The court reasoned that to hold otherwise would prevent the State from discharging
its burden under Hovey.97
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. 104 N.M. 667, 726 P.2d 344 (1986). SCRA 1986 11-606(B) is at issue:
Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment. Upon an inquiry into the validity
of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement
occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything
upon his or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to
or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in
connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question whether
extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention
or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror.
Nor may his affidavit or evidence of any statement by him concerning a matter
about what he would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes.
91. 104 N.M. at 670, 726 P.2d at 347. A defendant's right to be present is provided by SCRA
1986, 5-610.
92. 104 N.M. at 669-70, 726 P.2d at 346-47. But see concurring opinion of Justice Walters,
joined by Justice Sosa, relying specifically on the defendant's constitutional right for the concurrence.
Id. at 671, 726 P.2d at 348.
93. Id. at 668, 670-71, 726 P.2d at 345, 347-48.
94. 106 N.M. at 549-50, 746 P.2d at 655-56.
95. Id. at 550, 746 P.2d at 656.
96. Id. The court also held that the defendant had waived any right to appeal by not objecting
in the trial court, noting that Rule I1-606(B) is not a rule of procedure of constitutional dimension,
but a rule of evidence subject to waiver. Id.
97. Id. at 550. 746 P.2d at 656.

Fall 19891

EVIDENCE

The holding joins three others limiting the application of Rule 11606(B). In.State v. Jane Doe,9" the court of appeals construed the exception in the rule regarding extraneous prejudicial information to allow
jurors to testify about whether extraneous information reached the jury
and whether it prejudiced the jury.' In Duran v. Lovato,' ° the court of
appeals construed the same exception to allow jurors to testify about
independent vehicle speed tests the jurors, themselves, conducted in a
civil case where vehicle speed was an issue."' In State v. Martinez, °2 a
defendant who was attempting to prove the lack of an impartial jury was
allowed to present a juror's testimony that her acquaintanceship with the
defendant was falsely concealed during voir dire.' 03
Reading these cases together, Rule 11-606(B) appears to be limited to
the exclusion of evidence of jury incompetence which occurs wholly
within the confines of the jury room. Any extraneous influence, be it
improper seating of a juror due to error in voir dire, evidence from a
source outside the record, or answers to questions propounded to the court
during deliberations, may be proved by evidence from the jurors themselves.

98.
(1984).
99.
100.
(1983).
101.
102.
103.

101 N.M. 363, 683 P.2d 45 (Ct. App. 1983), cert. denied, 101, N.M. 276, 682 P.2d 61
101 N.M. at 366-67, 683 P.2d at 48-49.
99 N.M. 242, 656 P.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1982), cert. denied, 99 N.M. 226, 656 P.2d 889
99 N.M. at 247-48, 656 P.2d at 910-11.
90 N.M. 595, 566 P.2d 843 (Ct. App. 1977).
Id. at 597, 566 P.2d at 845.

